

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

The Future of the Saar

January 2, 1935
Vol. X, No. 22

25¢
a copy

Published Fortnightly
by the

\$5.00
a year

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
INCORPORATED
EIGHT WEST FORTIETH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y.

THE FUTURE OF THE SAAR

by

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with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

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THE ISSUES

ON January 13, 1935 the people of the Saar will go to the polls and indicate whether they wish to join Germany or France, or prefer to remain under the government of the League of Nations. On the basis of this plebiscite the League will determine the disposition to be made of the territory and its inhabitants. The Saar has an area of only 740 square miles—not quite three-fourths as large as Rhode Island—but with its population of 823,000 it is the most densely settled in Europe. Despite the small size of the Saar it has always been coveted by both French and Germans. Its coal fields, excelled on the continent only by those of the Ruhr and Upper Silesia, its metallurgical industry, and its strategic position directly north of Lorraine have made it a valuable prize. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 the French government demanded the annexation of the region, justifying its claims by rather tenuous historical arguments and by the necessity of exacting exemplary reparation for the destruction which German armies had wrought in France during the war. Annexation was stoutly resisted by President Wilson and Lloyd George, who pointed out that the territory had been in German possession since 1815, that its population was German, and that its separation from Germany could not be justified by the conditions of peace embodied in the Fourteen Points. Only after a serious crisis in the deliberations of the conference was a compromise finally achieved. The French were granted full title to the coal in the Saar “as compensation for the destruction of the coal-mines in the north of France and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany”; and the territory was placed for fifteen years under the rule of an international commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. Ultimate sovereignty over the Saar was to depend on the plebiscite to be held at the conclusion of this fifteen-year period.

Fear that this plebiscite might provoke a serious Franco-German conflict with dangerous implications for European peace has been almost entirely allayed as a result of


recent developments. The most significant of these has been the last-minute decision of the League of Nations to send an international force to police the Saar during the plebiscite period. In view of the tense political situation in this territory the League Governing Commission had repeatedly expressed apprehension that incidents might develop which its limited police force would be powerless to control. It had therefore served notice that it would call on French troops, if necessary, to maintain order; and the French government had clearly indicated that it would respond to such a request. The obvious dangers inherent in French intervention finally led the British government to propose an international police as a substitute. In accepting this proposal the French government has demonstrated that it sincerely wishes to avoid making the plebiscite a Franco-German issue. As further proof of this desire it has concluded with Germany an agreement settling in advance certain difficult questions, particularly relating to the repurchase of the coal mines, which will arise if the Saar is returned to the Reich. The French have therefore not entirely disregarded the numerous declarations of Chancellor Hitler that the Saar constitutes the only remaining territorial conflict between France and Germany.

NAZIS VS. ANTI-NAZIS

A few years ago the coming plebiscite was regarded as a simple contest between French and German influence, with the foregone conclusion that it would result in an overwhelming vote in favor of the Reich. Since the advent of the Hitler government, however, the plebiscite campaign has developed into an impassioned struggle between National Socialist sympathizers on the one side and anti-Fascist but equally German groups on the other. For many people in the Saar the choice is no longer between France and Germany, but between endorsement and repudiation of the Third Reich as the embodiment of German political philosophy and culture. No organized group is in fact campaigning for union with France. All the bourgeois

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS, VOL. X, No. 22, JANUARY 2, 1935

Published by-weekly by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated, 8 West 40th Street, New York, N. Y., U. S. A. RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL, President; WILLIAM T. STONE, Vice President and Washington representative; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; HELEN TERRY, Assistant Editor. Research Associates: T. A. BISSON, VERA MICHELES DEAN, WILLIAM KOREN, JR., HELEN H. MOORHEAD, DAVID H. POPPER, ONA K. D. RINGWOOD, CHARLES A. THOMSON, M. S. WERTHEIMER, JOHN C. DEWILDE. Subscription Rates: \$5.00 a year; to F. P. A. members \$3.00; single copies 25 cents. Entered as second-class matter on March 31, 1931 at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.



parties of the Saar, coordinated within a German Front, are fighting for a return to Germany, while the Socialist and Communist parties, together with a dissenting section of the Catholic Centre, are struggling against great odds to preserve League rule as the only possible alternative to the Hitler régime which they hate.

Behind the German Front stands the Reich which has apparently abandoned its designs on Austria, at least temporarily, and is concentrating all the guns of its smoothly functioning propaganda machine on the Saar. For Germany reacquisition of the Saar would be one more step in the liquidation of the odious "dictate" of Versailles. The "despoliation" of this German region contrary to the Fourteen Points and in defiance of the principles of self-determination has always been bitterly resented as one of the gravest injustices of the peace settlement. With the development of anti-Fascist opposition the Hitler government has therefore redoubled its efforts to win the Saar. It is not content to win a simple majority in the plebiscite, but is determined at all costs to secure a nearly unanimous vote in favor of Germany. Not only would such a vote preclude any division of the territory, the possibility of which is left open by the Versailles Treaty, but it would afford an impressive testimonial of the strength and prestige of the Hitler régime.

The Marxist parties arrayed against the German Front have united in an anti-Fascist front supported also by a number of Catholics. Although stamped as "traitors" and subjected to pressure and intimidation by the German Front, they claim to be the champions of true "Germanism" in resisting the incorporation of the Saar by the Third Reich. In their ardent struggle to uphold their conceptions of culture and social justice they are aided by the refugees from Germany who have made their headquarters in the Saar. For these emigrants the plebiscite represents a last opportunity to preserve a section of German soil from what they believe to be the "barbarism" and "oppression" of National Socialism.

THE FRENCH STAKE IN THE SAAR

In France this internecine strife between Germans has been watched with great inter-

est. Active agitation on behalf of the *status quo* is confined, however, to nationalists and anti-Fascist groups which hope for a defeat of the Hitler government. Nationalist circles emphasize the importance of maintaining the Saar as a buffer state between French Lorraine and the German Rhineland and point to the increase in Germany's economic *potentiel* should the region be reunited with the Reich. The powerful industrial groups are divided in their attitude toward the plebiscite. Some who have large investments in the Saar metallurgical industry are conducting an active campaign for the retention of the *status quo* through the press and the *Association Française de la Sarre* which they founded. Others, however, suffer from the competition of Saar industries and consequently would not object to reunion of the territory with Germany and dissolution of the Franco-Saar customs union. Among these may be counted the coal industry organized in the *Comité des Houillères* and even a part of the *Comité des Forges de France* which represents heavy industry.¹

The French government itself has not openly taken sides, realizing apparently that a frank espousal of League rule might permanently compromise its relations with Germany. Nevertheless it seems to prefer maintenance of the present régime in the territory. It has rejected the repeated pleas of Chancellor Hitler and other Reich leaders that Germany and France settle the Saar question by a direct understanding eliminating the necessity for a plebiscite which might further aggravate relations between the two countries. It has intervened energetically to insure a free vote and has been instrumental in obtaining guarantees which would protect advocates of the *status quo* against reprisals and the alleged terrorism of the German Front. The French government has also encouraged opponents of the Third Reich by attempting to make the *status quo* more attractive. As an inducement it has promised to surrender to the territory ownership of at least part of the coal mines and recommended that the population receive a greater share in the government and another opportunity to vote for union with Germany should developments in the Reich produce a change in public sentiment.²

THE PLEBISCITE CAMPAIGN

Throughout the plebiscite campaign the task of the League Governing Commission has been most difficult. Ever since it assumed office in 1920 its job has not been an enviable one. With the approach of the pleb-

iscite, however, the nature of its duties has undergone a complete change. While formerly the Commission acted chiefly as the arbiter between conflicting French and German interests and sought with little success

1. For an analysis of these conflicting interests, cf. Jean Galtier-Boissière and A. L. Sérurier, "La Vérité sur la Sarre," *Crapouillot*, Numéro Spécial, April 1934.

2. Cf. French memorandum to the League of Nations of August 31, 1934. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, October 1934, p. 1185-7.

to overcome the almost unanimous popular opposition to its régime, its function since 1932 has been to keep the peace between Nazi and anti-Nazi elements and to curb political excesses without at the same time abandoning its neutrality. The Commission has felt compelled to resort to numerous repressive measures, including suspension of newspapers, prohibition of meetings, and interdiction of uniforms and political badges. It has taken particularly drastic steps to restrict the activities of the German Front, whose political methods it holds largely responsible for the tense situation in the Saar.

In this difficult period the Commission has had as its chairman a British diplomat, Mr. Geoffrey G. Knox, who took over this post on April 1, 1932. He is one of the three members from neutral countries provided for by the Treaty of Versailles, the other two being Dr. d'Ehrnrooth of Finland and Dr. Zoricic of Yugoslavia. In addition, a native Saarlander, Herr Kossmann, and a Frenchman, M. Morize, serve on the Commission. Although the membership of the Commission thus appears to be well-balanced, a large section of the population has lost confidence in its impartiality. The Commission's efforts to protect the partisans of the *status quo* against pressure from the German Front have laid it open to the charge of hostility toward Germany. Its measures against political agitation have been enacted almost without exception over the opposition of Herr Kossmann and the German Front majority in the *Landesrat*, an elective council which has only advisory powers.

NAZI AGGRESSIVENESS

Before 1932 the Saar population did not experience much partisan political strife. Although the political parties were the same as in Germany, they were united in opposition to League rule which they contemptuously termed "nigger" or "colonial" government, because it seemed to place the Saar on the level of a colonial mandate incapable of governing itself. From Left to Right they were nationalist in outlook. Moreover, with 73 per cent of the population Catholic in faith, the strongest party was the moderate Catholic Centre. Even in November 1932, when Hitler was endorsed by a third of the voters in the Reich, the Saar National Socialists polled only 7 per cent in the elections for the *Landesrat*, whereas the Centre obtained 43 per cent, the Socialists 10 and the Communists 23 per cent.³ The Nazis, however, made up in enthusiasm and aggressiveness for their lack in numbers; and on November 8, 1932 the Governing Commission found it

necessary to dissolve the Storm Troops, the SA and SS, after a search of the Nazi party offices had convinced it of the military character of these formations.⁴

Following Hitler's accession to power in Germany the Saar National Socialist party grew rapidly in strength and influence, and its campaign against opponents of the new Germany became increasingly violent in character. The old-established bourgeois parties gradually abandoned the leadership of the German campaign to the Nazis. In order to confirm their loyalty to Germany they first united in a German Front in July 1933, and then, beginning October 1, 1933, followed the precedent set in the Reich and dissolved themselves one by one, the Centre acting only after considerable hesitation. A German Trade Union Front, headed by Herr Kiefer, the leader of the Christian unions, was also formed, thus making the process of coordination virtually complete. The Socialists and Communists, however, refused to submit.⁵ Moreover, as in Germany, the National Socialist party remained in existence. Its leader, who also took over direction of the German Front, was a fiery, aggressive and inexperienced young Nazi named Spaniol. His methods increasingly aroused the hostility of the Governing Commission which reported to Geneva that his party was "waging an incessant campaign of threats, denunciations and disguised boycotting against the inhabitants of the Territory suspected of not sharing its political ideas," and threatening "that any persons who oppose it will be made to pay heavily for their present attitude after the plebiscite."⁶

Conservative and influential Germans in the Saar as well as party officials in the Reich itself became greatly alarmed lest Spaniol's tactics compromise the German cause. An excuse to depose this turbulent leader came in January 1934 with the publication of a newspaper interview in which Spaniol, with complete lack of discretion, had vigorously attacked the Catholic Church.⁸ On February 28 the conservatives forced his retirement as leader of the German Front and replaced him with Jakob Pirro, who was also a member of the Nazi party but a man of more moderate views. From Berlin came an order dissolving the National Socialist party in the Saar. Both Herr Pirro and Rudolf Hess, deputy Nazi leader in the Reich, issued proclamations inviting all Saarlanders irrespective of previous party affiliations to join the reorganized German Front.⁹

4. League of Nations, "Fifty-second periodical Report of the Governing Commission," *Official Journal*, p. 404-25.

5. For an account of these developments, cf. Galtier-Boissière and Sérurier, "La Vérité sur la Sarre," cited, p. 34-5.

6. Cf. the Commission's fifty-fifth report, League of Nations, *Official Journal*, January 1934, p. 34-45.

8. Galtier-Boissière and Sérurier, "La Vérité sur la Sarre," cited, p. 37.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 39-40.

3. For the election figures, cf. *Bericht des Statistischen Amtes des Saargebietes*, Heft 11, 1933, p. 389. Out of a total of 362,631 ballots the number of National Socialist votes was 24,455.

MARXIST AND CATHOLIC OPPOSITION

Although these steps were taken to remove the growing antagonism toward Spaniol's methods and put an end to party strife, they have failed to overcome the opposition to union with the new Germany which has developed among certain sections of the Saar population. The German Front claims to have recruited many individual Communists and Socialists, but the official Marxist party organizations led by Max Braun and Fritz Pfordt have remained hostile. By organizing into a United Front they have actually become more aggressive in their opposition. Through their newspaper organs, they have seized every opportunity to discredit Hitlerism. To the intense indignation of the German Front, emigrés from Germany have actively collaborated in this campaign, both through existing press organs and their own weekly, the *Westland*.¹⁰

More important for the success or failure of the German cause has been the opposition manifested in Catholic circles, where developments in the Third Reich have aroused great anxiety. The anti-Catholic and even anti-Christian utterances of certain Nazi leaders, the toleration if not promotion of pagan movements, the elevation of Nazi racial ideology to a virtual religion, the conflict provoked by the attempted coordination of the Protestant churches, and the serious differences between the German government and the Vatican over the training of Catholic youth have all contributed to make Catholics hesitant about the desirability of union with Germany at this time. The most serious blow to Nazi prestige came with the "purge" of June 30, 1934, when two prominent Catholics, Dr. Klausener, head of the Catholic Action, and Herr Probst, leader of the youth organization *Jugendkraft*, met their deaths. This event created a profound impression in the Saar. Numerous well-attended memorial services were held in Catholic churches, culminating in a tribute to Herr Probst by some 50,000 members of Catholic youth associations assembled at Saarbrücken on July 29.¹¹

The Catholic opposition took form only gradually. The Centre party has never retracted the declaration of loyalty to Germany made when it joined the German Front. Its former organ, the *Landeszeitung*, has frequently criticized the church policy of the Reich, but has not become frankly antagonistic. It was not until May 1934 that a group of Catholics headed by Herr Hoffmann, once editor of the *Landeszeitung*, founded a daily newspaper, the *Neue Saar-Post*, openly hos-

tile to Hitlerism and advocating retention of the League régime. How numerous the adherents of this group have become only the plebiscite will show.¹² A large number of Catholics have apparently been unwilling to carry their disapproval of Nazi religious policy so far as to oppose return to the fatherland.¹³ Moreover, the champions of the *status quo* have been weakened by the Vatican's refusal to intervene. While the Holy See has watched the situation closely through a special legate resident in the Saar, it has remained neutral, apparently in the hope of thereby obtaining a more favorable policy toward the Church in Germany.

"TERRORISM" OF THE GERMAN FRONT

One of the factors militating against the success of the *status quo* advocates has been the powerful and all-pervasive organization of the German Front. Documents seized in a raid on the German Front offices last July throw a revealing light on the structure and methods of this organization. They proved to the Governing Commission that, despite the reconstruction of the German Front, "this group is merely a continuation of the National Socialist party," and that its methods, although perhaps less violent, have remained essentially the same.¹⁴

The German Front is constructed on the Nazi *Führerprinzip* or leadership principle, Herr Pirro, the *Landesleiter*, exercising dictatorial powers. Its organization is hierarchical, going up from the smallest unit—the "block"—through cells, local and district groups to the central directing organ or *Landesleitung*. The whole system, according to Mr. Knox, is "arranged with a view to reaching, individually, every inhabitant of the Saar, and to placing each person under control."¹⁵ The chief rôle in this organization has been played by the leaders of the blocks, known as *Blockwarte*, "who are carefully selected from among the influential members of the community." These have been able to get in personal touch with every individual and to keep close watch on his political opinions as expressed by the flag he flies from his home, the political meetings he attends and the newspapers he reads.

The activities of the *Blockwarte* have been reinforced by the so-called *Ordnungsdienst*

12. Under the motto, "For Christ and Germany, against National Socialism and Neo-Paganism," a new party, the *Deutsche Volksbund*, was launched at Saarbrücken on November 30. Its membership was reported to include representatives of Christian trade unions, 70 ecclesiastics, some officials and teachers, and even a number of Protestants. Cf. *Neue Saar-Post*, December 1, 1934.

13. Although the Catholic youth organizations at their meeting last July conspicuously ignored Hitler, they nevertheless telegraphed President von Hindenburg an assurance of their "unwavering fidelity." Cf. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, October 1934, p. 1201-4.

14. Cf. League of Nations, *Report of the Governing Commission on the Activities of the Deutsche Front*, November 6, 1934. C.490.M.215.1934.VII.

15. *Ibid*

10. The purchase of this paper by the German Front was recently reported. Cf. *New York Times*, November 30, 1934.

11. Cf. Michael T. Florinsky, *The Saar Struggle* (New York, Macmillan, 1934). p. 143.

which the Governing Commission calls "a sort of secret police." This force is 10,000 strong and is believed to play "the same part as the S.S. in Germany." It spies on government officials and avowed opponents, as well as on suspected elements within the German Front such as the group associated with the deposed leader Spaniol.¹⁶ The Catholic clergy has apparently been "under special observation," priests having been denounced for hostile utterances from the pulpit and for subscribing to the *Neue Saar-Post*. Lists of subscribers to the various anti-Hitler newspapers have also been obtained.¹⁷

The moral pressure thus exerted has on occasion been supplemented by more drastic measures. Opponents have been threatened, chiefly with what may happen "after 1935"; while merchants hostile to Hitlerism have been boycotted. Effective pressure has also been applied to prevent the placement of advertisements in hostile newspapers. Finally, the espionage activities of the German Front have at times been accompanied by denunciation and attempted kidnappings.¹⁸

In its campaign the German Front has collaborated closely with many Saar officials as well as with the government and authorities of the Reich. The Saar bureaucracy is almost wholly German and has always been one of the most nationalist groups in the territory. It is therefore not unnatural that many of its members have cooperated with the German Front. It has been almost impossible, for example, to prevent teachers from working with this organization and introducing its propaganda in the schools. The Reich government, especially the Propaganda Ministry, has maintained close connec-

tions with the German Front, chiefly through a confidential intermediary stationed at Cologne and through the Reich Commissioner for the Saar, who was formerly Herr von Papen and is now Herr Bürckel, the Nazi leader for the Palatinate. Activities of the German Front have been largely directed and also subsidized by the Reich. German radio stations, especially the one located at Frankfurt-am-Main, have also been extensively used, the Governing Commission accusing them of frequently issuing "libels or statements calculated to exert pressure or to intimidate voters."²⁰

These charges of "terrorism" brought against the German Front by the Governing Commission have been discounted by some neutral observers.²¹ In their opinion the German Front would never have been in the position to exercise pressure on the population unless from the very beginning it had greatly outnumbered its opponents, and the possibility of a vote against Germany had been regarded as exceedingly slim. The measures taken by the Governing Commission to protect this anti-German minority, they claim, have naturally been directed against the German Front and have involved it in such a conflict with this organization that the Commission has lost its sense of proportion and magnified unduly the significance of isolated instances of "terrorism." To prove the general moderation of the population they adduce its remarkable forbearance during the fifteen years of enforced separation from Germany, and point out that even in the plebiscite campaign cases of actual physical violence have been comparatively rare, considering the tenseness of the struggle and the issues at stake.

GUARANTEES OF A FAIR PLEBISCITE

The Treaty of Versailles made no detailed provisions for the plebiscite. It merely stipulated that the vote was to take place by districts or communes fifteen years after the Treaty had come into force, specified briefly who would be eligible to participate and laid down the alternatives which were to appear on the ballot. The other conditions, methods, and the precise date of the voting were left to be fixed by the League Council "in such a way as to secure the freedom, secrecy and trustworthiness of the voting."²²

16. *Ibid.* One of the documents seized, for example, reported that Spaniol had met somewhere "with the whole of his old guard. One of the songs sung was 'Kill the Pirroites. Death to Pirro.'"

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.* For instance, a letter from the *Auslandsorganisation* of the Nazi party in Germany to a member of the Saar *Ordnungsdienst* thanked the latter for obtaining information about a man designated as Fix and asked: "Can you suggest a means of getting Fix out of the Territory, if necessary with the use of force? We could, in Germany, get a warrant against Fix."

This task was entrusted by the Council on January 20, 1934 to a committee composed of Baron Aloisi of Italy as chairman, M. Lopez Oliván of Spain, and M. Cantilo of Argentina. The arrangements for the plebiscite were worked out by the committee after consultations with experts and lengthy negotiations with the French and German governments. They were approved by the Council on June 4 and December 6, 1934.

PLEDGES AGAINST REPRISALS AND DISCRIMINATION

The most important duty of the Committee was to assure the inhabitants of the Saar that they would on no account be penalized or made to suffer for their political activity or

20. *Report on the Activities of the Deutsche Front*, cited.

21. Cf. Florinsky, *The Saar Struggle*, cited, p. 136-7, 146-59; also T. P. Conwell-Evans, "Ein Engländer besucht die Saar," *Hochschule und Ausland*, November 1934.

22. Cf. Section IV, Annex, paragraph 34.

opinions in connection with the plebiscite. To that end it obtained on June 2 the following undertakings from the French and German governments:

- (a) To abstain from pressure of any kind, whether direct or indirect, likely to affect the freedom and trustworthiness of the voting;
- (b) Likewise to abstain from taking any proceedings or making any reprisals or discrimination against people having the right to vote, as a result of their political attitude in connection with the purpose of the plebiscite during the administration by the League of Nations;
- (c) To take the necessary steps to prevent or punish any action by their nationals contrary to these undertakings.²³

The Reich at first successfully insisted that these guarantees be confined to voters. Only after the French government and the Council Committee had brought much pressure to bear did Germany sign an agreement on December 3 extending the application of the undertakings to all inhabitants provided they will have resided in the Saar for at least three years on the day of the plebiscite. This condition still excludes German emigrés who have taken refuge in the territory. All who desire to leave the Saar within one year from the establishment of the definitive régime will, however, "be given every facility to retain or sell their immovable property and remove their movable property free of any charges." In addition the German government has undertaken for a period of one year not to subject Saar inhabitants, whatever their nationality, to any discrimination, either *de facto* or *de jure*, on account of their language, race or religion.²⁴ If the Saar returns to Germany the latter would therefore be forbidden to apply its Aryan legislation and other anti-Semitic measures for at least one year.²⁵

Two methods of enforcing these pledges have been provided. France and Germany have agreed for an indefinite period that any differences between either of them and any member of the League Council regarding the application or interpretation of the undertakings will be submitted for settlement to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. Thus any individual who believes that the undertakings are not being carried out can petition a member of the Council, and if the latter is convinced of the justice of the complaint it can place the matter before the Permanent Court for adjudication. In addition, persons who are victims of reprisals or discrimination can appeal directly to the Su-

preme Plebiscite Tribunal which has jurisdiction over such offenses. This right of direct appeal is of limited duration, however, for the Tribunal will cease to exist one year after the date of the plebiscite.²⁶

THE PLEBISCITE COURTS

This Tribunal is one of a number of special plebiscite courts established by the League Council in accordance with the recommendations of its Committee. In addition to the Supreme Tribunal, which is composed of a president, a vice-president and six judges, there are eight district courts consisting of single judges. The president of the high court is an Italian, Professor Bindo Galli, and the other judges have also been recruited from countries not directly interested in the Saar question. These tribunals replace the regular Saar courts in all matters relating to the plebiscite. Their jurisdiction covers, in particular, all disputes concerning eligibility to vote and validity of the voting, infractions of the plebiscite regulations, and breaches of the ordinary criminal law in so far as they endanger public order, hinder the preparation or carrying out of the plebiscite, or impair the freedom and integrity of the voting.²⁷ These courts began their activities on September 15. Only the Supreme Tribunal will continue to function beyond the day of the plebiscite.

Special measures have been taken to protect the interests of certain categories of the population. For the numerous beneficiaries of social insurance the Council Committee obtained a declaration from the German government—and also from the French—that all claims to insurance acquired in whole or in part under the League régime would be respected should Germany regain control of the territory.²⁸ At the request of the Governing Commission the Council also tried to reassure Saar officials, all but sixty-six of whom are German, "that the rights granted to them, both at present and in the future, by the deed of appointment which they have received from the Governing Commission will in any case be fully safeguarded."²⁹ The practical application of this principle was left to be settled by the Commission in direct negotiations with the German government which opened at Berlin on November 26, 1934.³⁰

23. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, June 1934, p. 651-2.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 649, 677-81.

25. Cf. *Report of the Committee of the Council*, December 5, 1934, cited.

26. Cf. letter of May 4, 1933 from Mr. Knox to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, and minutes of the Council session of May 27, 1933, *Official Journal*, July 1933, p. 835-8, 928-9.

27. *Report of the Committee of the Council*, December 5, 1934, cited. Of the 12,000 Saar officials, about half are German civil servants lent by the Reich to the Governing Commission when the latter took over the government of the Saar in 1920. The others have been appointed by the Commission itself. Cf. "General Report of the Governing Commission on the Position of Saar Officials after the Plebiscite," *Official Journal*, October 1934, p. 1207-13.

28. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, June 1934, p. 651-3.

29. League of Nations, *Report of the Committee of the Council*, December 5, 1934, C.526.1934.VII.

30. Aside from perhaps a thousand Jewish emigrants from Germany, about 4,000 Jews reside in the Saar according to census figures. The number of those having Jewish blood is, however, probably two or three times greater. Cf. *Bericht des Statistischen Amtes des Saargebietes*, cited, p. 17.

One of the most delicate questions which the League Council had to decide was whether, as part of its duty to insure a fair plebiscite, it should define more precisely the implications of a vote in favor of the *status quo*. Opponents of the Reich, supported by the French government,³¹ wanted the League to furnish some assurance that the Saarlanders would receive a greater share in the government than at present and would not be denied another opportunity to vote for union with Germany at a later and more favorable time. Although the Germans protested that an advance promise of this nature would constitute evidence of partiality, the Council Committee to which the question was submitted for examination granted in substance the petitions of the *status quo* advocates. Its report, approved by the Council on December 6, ruled that if the existing government is upheld, the League of Nations will become sovereign in the Saar and "therefore have the power, within the limits set by the Treaty, to make such changes in the organization of the present régime as it may consider appropriate in the interests of the population of the Territory and in the general interest," including the power to "dispose of its sovereignty."³²

THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE

The problem of policing the Saar during the plebiscite period was solved only after much delay. In a special report submitted in March 1934 the Governing Commission claimed that its own police was neither large enough nor sufficiently reliable to maintain order. The combined strength of the local gendarmerie and the Saarbrücken city police amounted to but 1,161 men, and of these only a small proportion could be mobilized for emergency duty. Since the policemen were recruited from the local population they found it difficult to refrain from taking sides in political strife, most of them sympathizing with the German Front.³³

To the Commission, the inadequacy of the local gendarmerie was all the more patent because of the tense political situation and recurrent rumors of a possible *coup de*

main.³⁴ Its apprehension was greatly increased by the revelations of documents seized at the offices of the German Front and relating to the Voluntary Labor Service. In its opinion these documents tended to prove that the 15,000 young Saarlanders who had enrolled in the labor corps had been undergoing some form of military training in German labor camps. Correspondence exchanged between the German Front and the Berlin offices of the Labor Service showed that plans had been discussed in 1933 for the enlistment of 10,000 Saar Germans who were to "receive special attention and instruction with a view to the Saar campaign" and be kept "beyond their period of training until they are recalled by the Saar Territory in the plebiscite year, 1935." The Commission's suspicion was strengthened by the suggestion, contained in this correspondence, that Saar volunteers be placed in camps situated in areas not demilitarized under the Treaty of Versailles and by a letter warning the directorate of one camp that those quartered there "should be given to understand that no accounts of what is going on must be sent home."³⁵ Although the German authorities promptly denied that Saar labor volunteers participated in military drills,³⁶ and the German Front pointed out that almost all of the Commission's evidence related to the period when the Labor Service was managed by the former Nazi party,³⁷ Mr. Knox submitted testimony tending to prove the continued existence of irresponsible elements³⁸ against whom he deemed it necessary to take precautions.

In its report of March 1934 the Governing Commission had declared that, unless an international police force of some 2,000 men was placed at its disposal during the plebiscite, it might have to call on French troops

34. These rumors, Mr. Knox reported on April 30, 1934, "are growing daily more insistent, reach the Commission's ears through the most varied channels, and are becoming increasingly circumstantial—so much so that they are now taking the form of schemes which, however extravagant, may not in the conditions now prevailing lie entirely beyond the bounds of possibility." Cf. *Official Journal*, May 1934, p. 455-6.

35. Cf. letter of August 17, 1934, together with annexes, from Mr. Knox to the Secretary-General. *Official Journal*, October 1934, p. 1188-1200.

36. In a *note verbale* of September 6 to the Governing Commission the Reich asserted that the special training of young Saarlanders consisted "solely of lectures about historical, cultural and economic questions in so far as they are concerned with the relationship of the Saar region with the German fatherland." The proposal to quarter Saar volunteers east of the demilitarized zone, it stated, was never carried out and was considered for a time only because other camps were crowded and it was desired to afford the Saar youth an opportunity to visit more distant parts of Germany. Cf. *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, September 9, 1934.

37. Cf. its petition of September 5 to the League of Nations. *Official Journal*, October 1934, p. 1223-6.

38. Mr. Knox transmitted to the League a letter dated July 9, 1934, in which the administrative head of the German Front warned Herr Pirro against the machinations of the former Nazi leader Spaniol and reported a threat by the latter that "if the present leadership results in the loss of the Saar Territory, he [Spaniol] would march in at the head of his (?) 17,000 unemployed in the Volunteer Labor Service and reduce the Territory to a heap of ruins." Cf. *Official Journal*, October 1934, p. 1222-3.

31. Cf. French memorandum to the League of Nations of August 31, 1934. *Official Journal*, October 1934, p. 1186.

32. Cf. *Report of the Committee of the Council*, December 5, 1934, cited. In legal justification of this ruling the Committee invoked paragraph 35 of the Annex to Section IV of the Versailles Treaty. This paragraph requires the League, after the plebiscite, to "decide on the sovereignty under which the territory is to be placed . . ." and, if it maintains the present Saar government, "to take appropriate steps to adapt the régime definitively adopted to the permanent welfare of the territory and the general interest."

33. In an effort to introduce some sort of equilibrium, the Governing Commission took into its service a number of police officials discharged in Germany for political unreliability or in application of the Aryan clause, but the employment of these "émigrés" aroused much bitterness in the Saar and threatened to disrupt the whole police force if carried too far. For the text of the report, cf. *Official Journal*, September 1934, p. 1141-6.

in the event of an emergency.³⁹ On June 4 the Council therefore authorized the Commission to enlist individual policemen outside the Saar, although not without urging that additional effectives be recruited locally as far as possible.⁴⁰ The Commission soon found recruitment of neutral police in the Saar impossible and, after the disclosures regarding the Labor Service, proceeded to seek enlistments abroad. It soon appeared, however, that no more than a few hundred men could be obtained in this way. Not only did the process of individual enlistment consume too much time, but in Switzerland, where the Commission had hoped to obtain most of its police, the government declined to permit recruiting in view of the country's traditional neutrality.⁴¹

Under these circumstances it became increasingly likely that the Commission might request the use of French troops. In a Council session on September 27 M. Barthou indicated clearly that France would respond to such a request, even though "extremely anxious for the avoidance of any menace which might require her intervention";⁴² and in November his successor, M. Laval, reiterated this point of view.⁴³ In Germany the prospect of an occupation of the Saar by French soldiers aroused intense indignation, and the German government protested that the dispatch of French troops would violate the Locarno pact. At the same time the Reich Commissioner for the Saar, Herr Bürckel, disavowed any intention to stage a *Putsch* and, as a gesture of good faith, prohibited—for the period from January 10 to February 10, 1935 and within a zone twenty-five miles from the Saar frontier—the wearing of uniforms and holding of rallies, drills or marches.⁴⁴ In the Saar Herr Pirro issued a similar disavowal and called on his followers to exercise the utmost discipline.⁴⁵

In order to remove the great danger of a Franco-German conflict over this issue the British representative, Captain Anthony Eden, dramatically proposed to the Council on December 5 that an international force not including troops from the two countries directly interested be formed and sent to the

Saar to preserve order.⁴⁶ This suggestion came as a complete surprise, since Great Britain had previously opposed such action and Sir John Simon had asserted in the House of Commons as late as November 5 that there was no question of dispatching British troops to the Saar.⁴⁷ Anxious to conciliate Germany, M. Laval immediately accepted Captain Eden's proposal on behalf of France. The following day the German government also gave its approval,⁴⁸ and on December 8 the Council formally adopted the plan. The United Kingdom and Italy agreed to furnish 1,500 and 1,300 men respectively, while the Netherlands and Sweden each consented to contribute a contingent of 250. A British officer, Major General John E. S. Brind, was appointed to command this international army⁴⁹—the first ever to be placed at the disposal of the League of Nations.

THE PLEBISCITE COMMISSION

The organization, direction and supervision of the plebiscite was entrusted to a Plebiscite Commission in accordance with a set of regulations, the details of which it was left free to modify. As its members the Council appointed M. A. E. Rohde of Sweden, M. D. de Jongh of the Netherlands, and M. V. Henry of Switzerland. Miss Sarah Wambaugh, an American and a recognized authority on plebiscites, was added as a deputy and technical adviser. The Commission took up its duties on July 1, 1934.

One of the chief functions of the Commission has been to arrange for the compilation of the electoral lists. Persons entitled to vote are those, without distinction of sex, who will be more than twenty years old on January 13 and who resided in the Saar, with intention to remain, on the day the Treaty of Versailles was signed, that is, on June 28, 1919.⁵⁰ The Commission has set up eighty-three voting divisions corresponding to administrative units known as *Bürgermeistereien* (unions of communes) or to single communes when these do not form part of any union. In each of these divisions the Commission appointed a communal committee of three members, including a neutral foreigner as chairman, to draw up the electoral lists.⁵¹ Eight district bureaus, composed of one or more officials not natives of

39. In justifying the legality of such a course the Commission recalled that in 1925, when the replacement of the French garrison in the Saar by a local gendarmerie was being considered, the Council asked the Commission to prepare a report on the subject which would take into account the possibility of obtaining the assistance of troops stationed outside the Saar. The following year such a report was made and noted by the Council in a resolution approved on March 18. It suggested that to provide in all cases for the protection of property and persons the Commission "should be entitled, at any time and immediately, to call on the troops stationed outside the Saar Territory and in the vicinity of its frontiers"—in other words, on French troops. Cf. *Official Journal*, September 1934, p. 1141-2.

40. *Official Journal*, June 1934, p. 649-50.

41. Communiqué of the Information Section of the League of Nations, September 25, 1934.

42. *Official Journal*, November 1934, p. 1462.

43. *New York Times*, November 7, 1934.

44. *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, November 3, 1934.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Journal des Nations*, December 6, 1934.

47. *The Times* (London), November 6, 1934.

48. *New York Herald Tribune*, December 7, 1934.

49. *New York Times*, December 12, 1934.

50. Treaty of Versailles, Section IV, Annex, paragraph 34; also Regulations for the Plebiscite, Articles 3-9, *Official Journal*, September 1934, p. 1151-9. People who have moved away from the Saar since June 28, 1919 and those temporarily absent on that date are not disqualified from voting, but persons who have settled in the region subsequently or were there without intention to remain, as in connection with the military occupation, are ineligible.

51. In reply to charges that the Saar members on the communal committees were almost without exception members of the German Front and incapable of impartial performance of their duties, the Plebiscite Commission has stated that "the members of these bodies have regarded their work as being of a purely technical character" and has paid tribute to the

the Saar or nationals of France or Germany, were established to superintend the communal committees and decide in the first instance all claims relating to the voting lists.

Applications for inclusion in the voting registers were accepted until September 1, 1934. Residents of the Saar were automatically inscribed and not required to file applications. The names were checked against police registers, electoral lists, and census material, all of which had earlier been gathered and placed under seal by a special League Commissioner.⁵² When the provisional lists were made public on September 26 they revealed 532,740 eligible voters.⁵³ A 30-day period was allowed in which residents could file claims to have names struck off the list, new names included, or other rectifications made.⁵⁴ The district bureaus were required to pass on these claims before November 9, and a fifteen-day interval was accorded for appeals to the plebiscite tribunals which were expected to make all decisions before December 17.⁵⁵ No less than 107,145 claims were presented. Although in its opinion a very large number appeared to be without foundation, the Commission ordered all of them examined. As the result of this examination 18,540 new

names were placed on the lists and 7,217 names removed.⁵⁶

Another task of the Plebiscite Commission is to supervise the election itself and the subsequent counting of the ballots. For the voting the electoral divisions are divided into polling sections of not more than 1,000 registered voters. In each section the balloting will be conducted by a bureau the chairman of which is a neutral foreigner appointed by the Plebiscite Commission.⁵⁷ The district bureaus named the other members—a secretary, two regular tellers and two deputies—from candidates submitted by the various political organizations in the Saar.⁵⁸ The polls will be open from 8:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. Before casting his ballot the voter will have to present not only an electoral certificate, with which he shall have been provided by the communal committee, but also an identity card, issued by the Saar authorities, or, if he comes from outside the Territory, a passport duly endorsed by the Saar police. In addition, his name will be checked against the electoral list in the possession of the bureau. Fraudulent voting is thus rendered practically impossible.⁵⁹ The ballots will be counted at Saarbrücken by neutral officials under the Commission's supervision, and thereafter brought to Geneva.

THE FATE OF THE SAAR AND FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION

The plebiscite will not automatically determine the fate of the Saar. The Treaty of Versailles specifies that "the League of Nations shall decide on the sovereignty under which the territory is to be placed, taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants as expressed by the voting." Although this provision would seem to make the Assembly equally competent, the Council, which has been called into session on January 11, is generally expected to make the decision.⁶⁰ The Treaty gives the League the possibility of dividing the territory, but it is doubtful whether such a division would be either prac-

ticable or politically wise. The economic unity of the Saar would make the detachment of any portion exceedingly difficult, and failure to surrender the entire region to Germany in accordance with the wishes of a simple majority of the people would undoubtedly provoke a storm of indignation in the Reich and create a permanent obstacle to Franco-German understanding.⁶¹

"genuine zeal and assiduity" with which they have performed their duties. Cf. "Second Monthly Report of the Plebiscite Commission," *Official Journal*, September 1934, p. 1160-3.

52. Cf. Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War* (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1934), Vol. 1, p. 432-5; also "Second Monthly Report of the Plebiscite Commission," cited.

53. Of this number 55,794 reside abroad. Cf. *Third Report of the Plebiscite Commission*, C.500.M.221.1934.VII. The Commission denied charges that the number of registrants was excessive. In a communiqué to the press it placed the number of residents in the Saar on June 28, 1913 at 680,000. After deducting the children born after January 13, 1915, about 51,000, and deceased persons, about 97,000, a total of 532,000 remained. To this sum it added about 8,000 persons who, though residents of the Saar, had not been inscribed in the police lists, and some 10,000 whose eligibility had not been definitely determined. The grand total of possible voters it therefore estimated at 550,000. Cf. *Neue Saar-Post*, October 24 and 26, 1934.

54. Article 23 of the Regulations, *Official Journal*, September 1934, p. 1153.

55. *Ibid.*, Articles 24 and 25.

56. *Fourth Report of the Plebiscite Commission*, C.501.M.-222.1934.VII. Practically all of the 28,253 petitions for corrections in addresses or the spelling of names were granted.

57. The commission has taken steps to obtain these chairmen, who number about 800, from near-by countries such as Switzerland, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. Cf. *Third Report of the Plebiscite Commission*, C.500.M.221.1934.VII.

58. All incidents and difficulties connected with the voting shall be decided by a majority vote of the electoral bureau, the chairman having a casting vote in case of a tie. Cf. *Fourth Report of the Plebiscite Commission*, cited.

59. For the text of the provisions regarding the polling, cf. Regulations for the Plebiscite, Articles 27-57, *Official Journal*, September 1934, p. 1153-7.

60. Because the final attribution of the Saar is assigned to "the League of Nations" rather than to the Council specifically, some commentators believe that the decision will require a unanimous vote. Cf. W. Schücking and H. Wehberg, *Die Satzung des Völkerbundes* (Berlin, Franz Vahlen, 1934, 3rd edition), Vol. 1, p. 115-6. Others, however, point out that under paragraph 40 of the Annex to Section IV of the Treaty the Council is empowered in all Saar questions to act by a majority vote. Cf. Curt Groten, *Die Volksabstimmung im Saargebiet* (Berlin, Wedemannsche Buchhandlung, 1934), p. 37-41.

61. Germans have often expressed the fear that, if the voting at all warranted it, France might demand annexation of the strip bordering Lorraine and extending up to the Saar River. Possession of this region would give France not only a more strategic frontier, but also the sparsely settled Warndt district with its rich and almost untouched coal reserves. It would also "restore" to France Saarlouis, a city of 17,000 inhabitants, which was founded and fortified in 1680 by Louis XIV and remained in French hands until 1815. Of all the cities in the territory, Saarlouis shows the most pronounced traces of French influence. Cf. A. Grabowski and G. W. Sante, *Die Grundlagen des Saarkampfes* (Berlin, Heymanns, 1934), p. 233; also Florinsky, *The Saar Struggle*, cited, p. 13-14.

THE COAL MINES AGREEMENT

If the League returns the territory to Germany, the latter is required by the Treaty to repurchase the Saar coal mines from France at a price payable in gold. Since considerable difficulties and consequent delays were anticipated in determining both the price and the conditions of payment, the French Foreign Minister, in his memorandum of August 31, 1934, suggested settlement of these and other financial questions before the plebiscite.⁶² The resulting negotiations were concluded with surprising rapidity, because the French government proved willing to make substantial concessions. Under the agreement reached at Rome on December 3 the Reich undertakes to pay 900,000,000 francs, or approximately 148,000,000 marks, for the mines and certain other French properties, including two short lines of the Alsace-Lorraine Railways and some customs stations.⁶³ The bulk of the purchase price will be paid by transferring to France 95 per cent of the amount of French francs, variously estimated at 600 to 1,500 million, which now circulate in the Saar as the only legal currency and which will be called in and exchanged against German marks. The balance will be met by coal deliveries which Germany is to make during the next five years. In addition to the sum of 900,000,000 francs, the French government will receive over a five-year period the dues to be paid by two French mining companies for the right to extract a maximum of 11,000,000 tons of coal under concessions which they hold at present in the Warndt district of the Saar.⁶⁴

The Franco-German agreement also regulates the question of French commercial credits in the Saar, and stipulates that 5 per cent of the francs circulating in the territory must be used to meet service on the outstanding foreign loans contracted by Saar public bodies and corporations with the approval of the Governing Commission.⁶⁵ No provision has yet been made regarding the large sums which French interests have invested

in Saar industrial enterprises, particularly in the heavy industry.⁶⁶ There would seem to be no insuperable obstacle to the continued participation of French capital should the region be reunited with Germany. Even if German capital were available to buy out French holdings, the Reich would probably regard it unwise to deprive France of its present financial stake in the sale of the iron and steel products of the Saar.

ECONOMIC FUTURE OF THE SAAR

The most urgent problem which remains to be settled if the Saar returns to Germany is the regulation of commercial relations between the territory and France. For a transitional period of five years after the Versailles Treaty came into force the Saar enjoyed complete free trade with both France and Germany. On January 10, 1925 the contemplated customs union with France became effective, and the territory would have been cut off from Germany had it not been for a series of agreements between the French and German governments through which its industries continued to be assured well-nigh unimpeded access to the German market.⁶⁷ In return for keeping its frontier open to Saar products Germany received much smaller concessions and, in the last few years particularly, its exports to the Saar have suffered greatly from the imposition of French quota restrictions. While the possession of such a large market has enabled the Saar to overcome to a large extent its inferiority as an industrial region to the Ruhr, the customs union with France has not been an unmixed blessing, for it has made the territory so dependent on the French market that its reintegration with Germany will undoubtedly be accompanied by great hardships. The exact degree of this dependence is impossible to determine since, in the absence of a customs barrier, no official statistics on Franco-Saar trade are available. Using figures on railway shipments, which are calculated in weight and are not always reliable, German authorities

62. *Official Journal*, October 1934, p. 1186-7.

63. For the text of the agreement, cf. *Report of the Committee of the Council*, December 5, 1934, Annex III, cited. In 1920 the Reparation Commission placed a provisional valuation of 400,000,000 marks on the mines and credited Germany with 300,000,000 as "delivery in kind." Cf. Florinsky, *The Saar Struggle*, cited, p. 180.

64. *Report of the Committee of the Council*, December 5, 1934, Annex III, cited. The total dues are not expected to exceed 50,000,000 francs.

65. The approximate amount of such loans has been estimated by the Commission as follows:

	French francs	£ sterling	dollars
Short-term	55,000,000		
Long-term	110,000,000	890,000	2,900,000

Loans and advances made without the Commission's consent were reported, on the basis of incomplete data, to aggregate 100,000,000 francs (short-term), and 93,000,000 francs and 1,000,000 Dutch florins (long-term). Cf. *Official Journal*, October 1934, p. 1200-1. The Council has postponed decision as to the future of these loans until after the plebiscite.

66. After the war the French government, fearing the effect of unrestricted competition in French markets, urged industrial and banking groups to acquire majority control of the iron and steel works in the Saar. Almost all the important Saar concerns, with the notable exception of those of the Röchling family, were persuaded and in some instances coerced to yield a 60 per cent participation to French capital. Even smaller metallurgical enterprises fell into French hands. Although a few have since returned to German control, the value of French investments was still estimated at 1,750 million francs in 1929. This figure, however, was regarded even at that time as a maximum and is now probably much lower. Cf. Eugene Staley, "Private Investments and International Politics in the Saar," *Journal of Political Economy*, October 1933; also H. Overbeck and G. W. Sante, *Saar-Atlas* (Gotha, Justus Perthes, 1934), p. 86, and Charles Drouard, "Les intérêts économiques français et les intérêts économiques sarrois," *La Sarre, ce qu'il faut en savoir*, May 1934.

67. For the text of the last agreement, concluded on February 23, 1928, cf. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 79, p. 247-404. A description of the customs régime may be found in Robert Capot-Rey, *La Région Industrielle Sarroise* (Berger-Levrault, Nancy-Paris-Strasbourg, 1934), p. 531-3.

have estimated roughly the relative importance of France and Germany as markets for the Saar in 1913 and 1925-1930.⁶⁸ According to these estimates the proportion of Saar coal absorbed by the Reich dropped from 58.7 to 16.8 per cent, while that marketed in France rose from 24.4 to 64.5 per cent. The iron and steel industry, which next to mining employs the most people, has also increasingly oriented itself toward France, the percentage of its products marketed in that country mounting from 4.4 to 34.4. In addition the Saar relies on Lorraine for 85 per cent of its iron ore.⁶⁹ Even the minor industries—glass and ceramics—have come to sell a considerable share of their production in France.

No matter what the fate of the Saar may be after the plebiscite, the region is likely to suffer economically. If the League régime is maintained, Germany will probably deprive the Saar of free access to the German market; while if the territory is returned to Germany, the French customs frontier will be reestablished and the Reich will face the almost insuperable task of absorbing most of the Saar production which now goes to France. In the latter eventuality it will be particularly difficult to find a market for Saar coal. Plans have been made to facilitate its sale in southern Germany through the construction of a 132-kilometer canal connecting with the Rhine at Ludwigshafen and through the conversion of coal into electric power and gas,⁷⁰ but even if these projects should materialize, production would still have to be curtailed considerably unless France continued to buy. The economic reintegration of the Saar with Germany would be facilitated if France, in return for German concessions, would consent to accord favorable customs treatment to the territory's products. Germans contend that an agreement of this nature would also be to the advantage of the French, since in France the Saar is generally ranked as the country's fifth or sixth best customer⁷¹ and the prosperity of Lorraine farmers is generally held to depend on retention of the Saar market. Although some French authorities deny this contention,⁷² it should not be difficult to make some sort of arrangement which would pre-

serve, at least for a transitional period, the close economic ties between France and the Saar.

CONCLUSION

The reincorporation of the Saar with Germany would mark the end of an interesting experiment in international administration. Whether the experiment has justified itself will probably always be a matter of controversy. The League government has on the whole proved efficient, and appears to have provided adequately for the economic and social welfare of the people. Under its régime the Saar has also been spared many of the economic and political troubles which have afflicted Germany. Yet, no matter how beneficent this rule may seem to outsiders, the Saarlanders themselves have never, at least until recently, appreciated its "blessings." They have resented the tutelage of an international commission and have looked on its members as agents of the "dictate" of Versailles which separated them from the fatherland against their will. The League Governing Commission has never been able to overcome the handicap of its origin, even though it has often sought sincerely to conciliate the population.

Maintenance of the existing Saar régime after the plebiscite would mean the aggravation of the present conflict between France and Germany. In this conflict the League of Nations, as newly created sovereign of the Saar, would probably become involved, and as a result its prestige as an international organization might suffer. The Saar people themselves would have no peace as long as they remain the object of international strife. For these reasons the return of the territory to Germany may be the only wise solution of the Saar problem. Such a settlement might conceivably pave the way for a genuine Franco-German rapprochement and would mark one more step in the progressive dissolution of that association between the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles which, in the opinion of many observers, has seriously handicapped the Geneva institution.

68. Overbeck and Sante, *Saar-Atlas*, cited, p. 94-6. In each case Alsace-Lorraine is included with France.

69. *Saarwirtschaftsstatistik*, Heft 7, 1933 (Saarbrücken, 1934), p. 32.

70. Karl Busemann, *Die Rückgliederung der Saar* (Frankfurt, Societäts-Verlag, 1934), p. 22-4, 42-5.

71. Drouard, "Les Intérêts économiques français et les intérêts économiques sarrois," cited, p. 13.

72. The opinion has been expressed that only the Saar would profit from a reciprocal trade agreement. According to this view, the territory could not in any case dispense with Lorraine iron ore and farm products, while the pressure of free German competition would make the decline in other French exports unavoidable. Cf. Capot-Rey, *La Région Industrielle Sarroise*, cited, p. 591-3.